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MONTANA OUTFITTERS V. FISH AND GAME
COMMISSION: OF ELK AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Jim Ramlow
I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 1977, the United States Supreme Court announced it would hear an appeal from the decision of the United
States District Court for Montana in Montana Outfitters Action
Group v. Fish & Game Commission.' The three-judge district
court's decision affirmed the constitutionality of Montana's nonresident hunting license statute,2 which requires a nonresident elk
hunter to purchase a "big game combination license" to hunt deer,
elk, black bear, and birds and to fish, at a cost of two hundred
twenty five dollars. 3 A nonresident must purchase the combination
license, even if elk hunting is his only interest. A resident elk hunter,
on the other hand, can obtain a license for elk alone, at a cost of
nine dollars.4 This results in a twenty-five to one fee differential
between resident and nonresident elk hunters.5
Four nonresident hunters from Minnesota and an association of
several Montana outfitters and dude ranchers challenged the law's
constitutionality under the privileges and immunities clause' and
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment 7 of the United States Constitution.8 In a divided opinion, the district court upheld the law.? As the United States Supreme Court's decision on the appeal could affect long standing fish
and game management policies of many States," this note will ex1. 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mont. 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-1150).
2. Id. at 1010.
3. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), § 26-202.1(12) (Supp. 1975).
4. Id. §§ 26-202.1(1),(2),(4), 26-230.
5. This differential is ameliorated if the cost to a resident of the black bear, deer, and
other licenses are taken into account. A resident's total cost for deer, black bear, elk, bird,
and fishing licenses is $30. The cost differential thus calculated is 7.5 to 1 against the nonresident.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
7. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1007
(D. Mont. 1976). Based on Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the court found
standing for two of the nonresident plaintiffs, who asserted that the license law had an
adverse effect on their "economic interests." 417 F. Supp. at 1008. Because these two nonresidents presented all the issues, the court did not rule upon standing for the other plaintiffs.
9. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D.
Mont. 1976). (Smith and Jameson, JJ., constituted the majority; Browning, Circuit Judge,
dissented).
10. See generally Report to the Western Association of State Game and Fish Commis-
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amine the basis of the district court's holding and the dissenting
judge's opinion, and will suggest specific issues that the Supreme
Court should resolve.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING

The district court's per curiam decision dealt with the issues
briefly. Because the State's "power to manage and conserve" the elk
was conceded by the plaintiffs, the court found it unnecessary to
discuss the State's contention that it owned the elk within its
boundaries." It dismissed the plaintiff's privileges and immunities
claim because the right they asserted was not a commercial right,
but merely "a chance to engage temporarily in a recreational activ2
ity in a sister state.'
Finally the court considered the equal protection claim. It determined that the challenged statute did not infringe upon any of
the plaintiffs' fundamental interests because "the asserted right [to
hunt for sport] does not have a constitutional basis . . . . ,,,3 Thus,
the court employed the least strict standard of judicial scrutiny:
"whether the [classification] bears some rational relationship to
legitimate state purposes.""
The purpose of Montana's licensing statute is the conservation
of elk by means of restricting the number of hunters.' 5 The question
for the court was whether a statute which discriminates against
sioners on Nonresident Hunting and Angling by the Wildlife Management Institute (July
1971). Tables IV and V of the Report indicate the extent of state hunting and fishing license
fee differentials in the western United States.
11. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005,
1008-09 (D. Mont. 1976). State ownership of game has been advanced as a justification for
discrimination. The Supreme Court has critized the concept: "The whole ownership theory,
in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
12. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1009
(D. Mont. 1976). The privileges and immunities clause guarantees to the citizens of one State
the right to do business in another State on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of
the latter State. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). Because commercial fishing
involves "doing business", the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes which do not allow
nonresident commercial fishermen this substantial equality. Id. at 395-403.
The Montana Outfitters court distinguished the facts before it from the commercial
fishing cases, on the basis that "[tihe elk is not and never will be hunted commercially."
417 F. Supp. at 1007.
The district court did not decide the plaintiffs' due process claim, nor did the plaintiffs
raise this issue in their appeal. See 45 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977).
13. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1009
(D. Mont. 1976).
14. Id. at 1010.
15. Id.
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nonresident hunters by imposing a licensing fee that is twenty-five
times the fee imposed on resident hunters, is rationally related to
that purpose. The court pointed out that any hunting regulations
involving license fees are bound to favor some and disadvantage
others. "Any regulatory system which imposes a license fee in some
sense discriminates against those who can't afford to pay it."'" Further, if the State issued a fixed number of permits based upon an
open lottery, the result would be free of discrimination, but politically untenable. "A legislature might with some rationality conclude that a pure lottery open to all potential elk hunters in the
United States might destroy the political motivation to Montana
citizens to underwrite the elk management program in the absence
of which the species would disappear."' 7 Based upon this finding
that the discrimination against nonresidents is rationally related to
the maintenance of necessary political support for the elk management program, the majority concluded:
[W]here the opportunity to enjoy a recreational activity is created
or supported by a state, where there is no nexus between the activity and any fundamental right, and where by its very nature the
activity can be enjoyed by only a portion of those who would enjoy
it, a state may prefer its residents over the residents of other states,
or condition the enjoyment of the nonresident upon such terms as
it sees fit. 8

III.

THE DISSENT

Circuit Judge Browning strongly dissented from the court's reasoning and conclusion on the equal protection claim. Like the majority, he analyzed the claim under the rational relationship test.
But he rejected the idea that the maintenance of continued political
support is a sound basis for concluding that the discrimination is
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose:
[T]he principle appears to be that . . . a state may justify the
constitutionality of a discriminatory statute by showing that political support by the class of people to be benefitted by the discrimination is necessary in order to continue the program that benefits
them.
I do not believe discrimination for such a purpose is permitted
by the Equal Protection Clause. 9
Political support, Judge Browning pointed out, was not suggested
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1011 (Browning, J., dissenting).
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by the State as a possible justification for the discrimination. It was,
'2
he said, "a novel theory not . . . supported by any authority.
The rationale that discrimination was necessary for local political support of a state program was rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in 1974 in Memorial Hospitalv. Maricopa County.'
Maricopa involved an Arizona statute which prevented indigents of
less than one year's residence in a county from receiving free, nonemergency medical care. The defendant county argued that "the
requirement was necessary for public support of that medical facility. '22 The Supreme Court answered the county's contention directly: "A state may not employ an invidious discrimination to
sustain the political viability of its programs. '23 Similarly, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the same rationale in Cole v.
Housing Authority. 2 The circuit court invalidated a New Hampshire requirement which conditioned eligibility for low cost public
housing on two year's duration of residence.2
The objective of achieving political support by discriminatory
means . . .is not one which the Constitution recognizes. Nor do
we believe the goal of promoting provincial prejudices toward long
time residents is cognizable under a Constitution which was written partly for the purposes of eradicating such provincialism."6
Both the Maricopa and the Cole cases involved state infringements of fundamental rights and were thus subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, requiring the State to show that the discriminatory
classification was necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest.27 Yet Judge Browning contended that the principle which
they articulated was no less applicable to this case although it involved no fundamental right. 28 The idea that discrimination might
be justified by the need for political cooperation was itself illegitimate: "These cases rejected justification of discrimination on political grounds because justification on such a basis is inherently inappropriate, not because the right infringed was fundamental. '29
The majority's reasoning, in Browning's opinion, was "at odds
20. Id.
21. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
22. Id. at 266.
23, Id.
24. 435 F.2d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court cited Cole with approval in
its Maricopa decision. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267 (1974).
25. Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 813 (lst Cir. 1970).
26. Id.
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
28. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1012
(D. Mont. 1976) (Browning, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
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with the principle that constitutional rights are not subject to abrogation by majority will."" ° He concluded that a rule allowing a state
to "condition the enjoyment of the nonresident upon such terms as
it sees fit" 3' because of the State's need for local political support
of its programs is "impossible to limit. ' 32 "It would immunize even
the most arbitrary discrimination from constitutional attack whenever it could be contended reasonably that the discrimination was
''
necessary to obtain political support for the state activity. 3

IV.
A.

THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Degree of Discrimination

The plaintiff nonresidents did not challenge the State's power
to charge them a greater amount for their hunting licenses than it
charges a resident hunter.3 4 They alleged that by requiring a nonresident to purchase a combination license, covering several species of
game, and by imposing a "significantly higher" 3 fee, the State deprived them of their right to equal protection of its laws. It was not
the classification itself that the plaintiffs complained of; it was
rather the "magnitude and type ' 36 of differential that they alleged
'37
had "no rational basis.
The question underlying this contention is whether a State
must relate any differential charge it assesses a nonresident to actual costs the State incurs by permitting him to enjoy a state resource. The plaintiffs introduced testimony of an economist to show
that on a cost allocation basis, Montana could justify a license fee
ratio of no more than 2.5 to 1. 38 Assuming this testimony to be
accurate, does this mean that Montana could not charge a nonresident hunter any more than two and one-half times as much as it
charges a resident? A similar problem faced the United States Su30. Id. Judge Browning cited language from West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942): "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
The Judge also cited Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1963).
31. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1010
(D. Mont. 1976).
32. Id. at 1012 (Browning, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1007-08.
35. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 7, Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mont. 1976).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1008
(D.Mont. 1976).
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preme Court in Toomer v. Witsell,39 in which the Court invalidated
a state law which charged nonresident commercial fishermen at a
rate one hundred times greater than residents. 0 The Court stated
its test in terms of "close relation:" "[T]he inquiry in each case
must be concerned with whether such reasons [justifying the discrimination] do exist and whether the degree of discrimination
bears a close relation to them."'" "We would be closing our eyes to
reality," the Court observed, "if we concluded that there was a
reasonable relationship between the danger represented by noncitizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon
them."4 In Mullaney v. Anderson,'3 also involving a discrimination
against nonresident commercial fishermen, the Court struck down
an Alaska license law which employed a 10 to 1 differential against
the nonresidents." Once again, the Court conceded that in establishing the amount of a nonresident fee, a state legislature' could
take into account its own costs, but determined that the particular
law in issue could not be justified on that basis: "[Tihere is no
warrant for the assumption that the differential in fees bears any
relation to this difference in cost, nothing to indicate that it would
'merely compensate' for the added enforcement burden."" The
Mullaney Court cautioned that "[c]onstitutional issues affecting
taxation do not turn on or even approximate mathematical determinations. .

.

. [S]omething more is required than bald assertion to

establish a reasonable relation between the higher fees and the
higher cost to the Territory."' 7
The Toomer and Mullaney cases were not, however, decided
under the equal protection clause. Because they involved the right
to carry on a business, the laws in each were held violative of the
privileges and immunities clause. 8 So the matter to be resolved is
whether the reasonable relationship test articulated in these decisions has any bearing on the Montana Outfitters situation, which
involves no commercial interests and no fundamental interests.
Federal decisions concerning the level of nonresident tuition
39. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
40. Id. at 403.
41. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
43. 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
44. Id. at 418. A nonresident license cost $50, a resident license only $5.
45. For purposes of legislative power over nonresidents, the Court held that it made no
difference that at that time Alaska was a territory and not a State. Id. at 420.
46. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
396, 403 (1948).
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charged by state universities may provide guidance on this issue.'
In Johns v. Redeker50 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the
test for determining whether the rate of tuition charged to a nonresident student violated the student's right to equal protection of the
law as a test of reasonableness: "A reasonable additional tuition
charge against nonresident students which tends to make the tuition charged more nearly approximate the cost per pupil of the
operation of the schools does not constitute an unreasonable and
arbitrary classification violative of equal protection." ' The Johns
principle was echoed in a more recent case, Sturgis v. Washington,52
involving an attack on a nonresident tuition statute in the State of
Washington. The case actually dealt with the State's classification
procedures, but, in dicta, the federal district court noted its reasons
for concluding that the higher rate of tuition was itself within the
State's power to enact:
The record before us is devoid of evidence, or even a suggestion,
that this tuition residency requirement was intended for any reason other than to cover the bare costs of providing for the students'
costs of education. In fact, the only evidence before this Court
which relates to the actual cost of higher education in the State of
Washington shows that the fees for a non-resident student are
directly related to the cost of educating that student.53
The "directly related" observation is, of course, not stated as a
requirement in Sturgis, but the Johns decision comes closer to saying that the "reasonable" or "nearly approximate" standards are
required by the equal protection clause.
If these tests are accepted as controlling nonresident hunting
legislation, then how close to actual costs do "reasonable" or
"nearly approximate" require the State to come? In a 1971 report,
the Wildlife Management Institute in Washington, D.C. concluded
that most States would be justified, on a cost basis, in charging
nonresidents a fee five times greater than the resident's fee.5 4 Among
the factors cited by the Institute to justify this differential rate were
extra license publicity, direction, publications, correspondence and
overhead for administering nonresident hunting; excess enforce49. Because the right to an education is not a constitutional right, such tuition policies
do not affect any fundamental interests of nonresident students, nor do they affect a right to
do business. Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash.), afj'd mem., 414 U.S.
1057, 1058 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem.,
401 U.S. 985 (1971).
50. 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
51. Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
52. 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057, 1058 (1973).
53. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
54. Wildlife Management Institute Report, supra note 10, at 10.
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ment costs; administration of packers and guides; and winter game
range acquisition and development to maintain larger big game
herds .5
Under the equal protection standards set forth by Johns, however, it may be inappropriate to speak in terms of uniformly acceptable ratios or differentials. The percentage of nonresident hunters
varies greatly from State to State." Thus no uniform differential
could meaningfully approximate the additional costs any particular
State actually incurs by permitting nonresidents to hunt. If States
are required, under the equal protection clause, to establish differential fee requirements that do not go beyond "nearly approximating" additional state costs, each State will have the task of determining an appropriate ratio. In any case, the Montana Outfitters
opinion makes it clear that Montana cannot justify the present rate
of discrimination against nonresidents on cost factors alone. "7
B.

PoliticalSupport as Justificationfor a Discrimination

The Montana Fish and Game Commission did not suggest the
need for local political support for conservation of wildlife as a rational link between the discrimination against nonresidents and the
State's conservation policy. 8 The dissenting judge concluded that
this idea was "inherently inappropriate" and "impossible to
limit."5 The United States Supreme Court also rejected it, in the
context of a state infringement of fundamental rights.'" Yet the
district court relied on the need for local political support as a rational basis upon which to justify the discrimination. The second
unresolved issue, therefore, is whether a state may justify a discrimination involving no fundamental rights based upon its need for
local political support for conservation. Or is political support in
fact "inherently inappropriate" under any circumstances, as Judge
Browning contended?
As Browning's dissenting opinion conceded, the cases in which
the political support rationale was rejected involved infringements
of fundamental rights. Maricopa6' and Cole v. Housing Authority 2
55. Id. at 9.
56. The Wildlife Management Institute Report indicates that in 1970 the percentage
of nonresident hunters in California was 0.3%, while in Wyoming in the same year, 52.8% of
the hunters were from out of State. Montana's 1970 figure is reported as 8.1% (238,517
residents to 20,850 nonresidents). Id. Table I.
57. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1008
(D. Mont. 1976).
58. Id. at 1011 (Browning, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1012 (Browning, J. dissenting).
60. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 266 (1974).
61. Id. at 256-62. The right to travel was extensively discussed in Maricopa. The Su-
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both involved penalties on the constitutionally protected right to
travel. Two other cases upon which Judge Browning relied held that
constitutional rights were beyond abrogation by majority will, but
those cases also involved fundamental rights. 3
The court in Cole suggested that the political support rationale
could not survive even the "rationally related" test of equal protection scrutiny. The court concluded this not because political support was never rationally related to a state end, but because "[t]he
objective of achieving political support by discriminatory means
. . . is not one which the Constitution recognizes." 4 Such an argument, however, is inconsistent with the often repeated "rationally
related" standard of scrutiny that courts apply to state legislation
alleged to violate the equal protection clause. As Chief Justice Warren stated in McGowan v. Maryland, "[a] statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.""s
Elk are a fragile resource. The preservation of a livable habitat
for elk as well as many other wild game species in Montana and
other States is no small task. The State must carefully plan and
manage its resources, because the amount of natural range is
steadily dwindling. If Montana's big game species-a resource of
immeasurable value to many Montanans-are to survive, they need
protection from the encroachment of "civilization". Such protection
is costly and time consuming, and involves innumerable decisions
of local policy makers. The State's wildlife conservation programs
could well lose local support if increasing numbers of nonresidents
squeezed out all but a small percentage of Montana hunters. The
elk would indeed be in danger of disappearing." Thus, it cannot be
contended that local political support is not rationally related to the
States' legitimate interest in preserving the elk herds. Under the
deferential standard of equal protection scrutiny applicable to this
preme Court uses that term in the limited sense of the right of "migration with intent to settle
and abide." Id. at 255. For that reason it seems unlikely that the nonresident hunter's right
to travel is penalized by high license fees.
62. 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970).
63. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1963) (free exercise of religion); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942) (right to cast an equal
vote). In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the State had penalized the free
exercise of religion by school children, in violation of the first amendment. In Lucas v.
Colorado General Assembly, it was "[an individual's ponstitutionally protected right to cast
an equally weighted vote" that was threatened.
64. Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1970).
65. McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See also Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499 (1976).
66. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1010
& n. 19 (D. Mont. 1976).
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case, the analysis should end here. For a court to continue its inquiry into the inherent appropriateness of the justification would be
to apply a level of scrutiny beyond the court's legitimate scope of
67
review under the McGowan standard.
Judge Browning observed that the State did not suggest the
need for local political support of its conservation program as a
justification for the discriminatory fees. When a court applies the
"rationally related" level of judicial scrutiny to an equal protection
claim, however, its analysis is not limited to the justifications which
the States provides: "Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them."6'
V.

CONCLUSION

The problems raised by the nonresident hunters' claim to equal
protection of the laws are complex and will require sensitive attention to the interests at stake if they are to be successfully resolved.
Equal protection is a strongly held popular, as well as constitutional, value. As Archibald Cox commented, "Once loosed, the idea
of Equality is not easily cabined. '"6 On the other hand, strict adher67. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). In recent years, two members of
the Supreme Court, Justices Marshall and White, have argued that the Court in fact applies
a multi-tiered analysis to equal protection claims. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458
(1973) (White, J., concurring). The varying degrees of scrutiny, these justices argue, depend
upon the type of interests asserted by the State and by the individual. As Justice Marshall
explained, the Court balances "the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individualsin the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that
they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification" to
determine whether the statute is constitutional. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall quoted his dissenting
opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970)) (emphasis added).
Even under this mode of analysis, the challenged statute is constitutional. Because the
classification does not discriminate against a "discrete and insular" group which needs
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process," the character of the classification is not one to evoke an exacting scrutiny. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n. 4 (1938). Similarly, the importance of the nonresidents' interest in hunting for sport
does not approach being fundamental, especially when compared to the courts' classification
of nonresident students' interest in higher education. See Sturgia v. Washington, 368 F. Supp.
38, 41 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057-58 (1973); Starus v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp.
234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). Finally, the State's interest is
extremely weighty: political support for the State's conservation programs is essential to the
preservation of much of Montana's wildlife.
68. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
69. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968).
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ence to equality may not go hand in hand with a viable wildlife
management program. One of Montana's unique characteristics is
that it contains some of the few remaining areas where wild elk can
thrive. The continued existence of that quality habitat, and thus,
the continued existence of Montana's elk are factors that must be
taken into account in weighing the relative interests that are now
before the Supreme Court.
However inapplicable the political support justification is to
cases involving fundamental rights,7 0 there is good reason to consider it seriously here. Although a State may decide at any time to
subsidize health care or housing, it is only limited by the will of its
people in such social welfare decisions. Wild elk, on the other hand,
are not so adaptable to changes in the social or political attitudes
toward conservation. Once range management and controlled harvest are no longer carefully regulated by an interested public, the
elk's drastic reduction or even disappearance is virtually inevitable.
Many other species of wildlife have disappeared due to public apathy, and there is no reason to suppose the elk are somehow immune
to extinction.
Beyond the need for general support of conservation programs,
the State must also have the individual resident's willingness to
cooperate. Montanans have a long-standing tradition of relatively
open access to hunting privileges. If they are denied such access
because of increased nonresident competition for licenses, many
may simply ignore the license regulations altogether. In a large,
sparsely populated area, the opportunity to poach big game is all
too obvious. It is, in turn, all too obvious what effect any widespread
unlicensed hunting would have on the elk population.
Thus, while the need for local political support is not an adequate justification for discriminatory state laws which infringe fundamental interests, such local support is crucial to the continued
existence of Montana's wildlife. If the elk are once lost, it may be
exceedingly difficult to bring them back. Conservation needs often
directly bring our attention to the fact that we live in an imperfect
world of imperfect choices: "As is so often the case in human affairs,
different sets of desiderata are in competition."'" Perhaps the real
choice is simple: Elk or equal protection.
70. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Cole v. Housing
Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1970).
71. Note, The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV.J.L.GIS. 244,
280 (1975).
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